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The Cathedral Engulfed: Sea-Level Rise, Property
Rights, and Time
J. Peter Byrne∗
Global climate change has and will lead to substantial rises in
global sea levels. The now inevitable rise in sea levels poses new
and difficult challenges to property rights and land-use regulation.
Inundation and storm surges will physically destroy private and
public property at great loss. But perhaps more fundamentally, the
threats of such losses and the predictable efforts to contain them
will call for new approaches to land-use regulation and strain
traditional understandings of property rights in land. Neither the
common law nor traditional notions of zoning contain legal
resources adequate to cope with the economic, environmental, and
human risks that sea-level rise will generate. New forms of
regulation and shifts in the content of common law rules will
generate novel claims of regulatory takings, confronting courts
with puzzling questions of fundamental rights under unprecedented
climatic conditions.
This Article seeks to clarify the kinds of regulatory takings
questions that sea-level rise will generate, building on the
emerging legal literature concerning adaptation to climate change.
The Article unequivocally accepts the strong scientific consensus
that global climate change is caused by human activity emitting
greenhouse gases.1 Prompt and far-reaching legal and cultural

Copyright 2012, by J. PETER BYRNE.
∗ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. The author
wishes to thank Daniel Ashby for helpful research assistance. Profound thanks
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draft. All errors are the author’s.
The title of this Article invokes the seminal article on the nature of property
rights, Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
The point only is to suggest how sea-level rise, and changes in the natural world
more generally, may upend some settled and static notions about the “cathedral”
of property law, something Calabresi and Melamed probably would not disagree
with. The title also borrows from Claude Debussy’s innovative prelude for
piano, La cathédrale engloutie.
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Muller, The Conversion of a Climate-Change Skeptic,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/
30/opinion/the-conversion-of-a-climate-change-skeptic.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
William D. Nordhaus, Why the Global Warming Skeptics Are Wrong, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/mar/22/
why-global-warming-skeptics-are-wrong.
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reforms are needed to reduce global emissions.2 However,
questions of legal adaptation to global warming and other
observable climate phenomena do not require adherence to any
explanation for climate change, so long as the reader accepts the
observable fact that seas are rising. Adaptation measures do not
seek to mitigate or stop climate change but rather seek to change
legal regimes to cope with its physical consequences.3 Failure to
adapt will put at hazard life, property, and vital ecological services.
Even jurisdictions politically deadlocked over proposals to reduce
greenhouse gases may accept the necessity for legal change to
adapt to climate change. Of course, from the perspective of those
who accept the scientific consensus about anthropogenic climate
change,4 political paralysis over mitigation increases the urgency
for adaptation measures. Because of the greenhouse gases’
durability in the atmosphere, serious warming will occur for many
years even if humans presently find the capacity to dramatically
reduce emissions.
The consequences that climate change has for natural resources
upon which humans depend are impressive and varied. Increased
heat, habitat modification, species extinctions, drought, extreme
storms, and flooding pose large public health and resource
management challenges, some of which have received extensive
analysis in the legal literature.5 Given the ecological importance of
coastal areas and clustering of development within them, sea-level
rise presents problems of great practical concern and compelling
2. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1153 (2009).
3. On the emerging law of adaptation, see THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS (Michael B. Gerrard &
Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012). For a comprehensive review of adaptation
initiatives in the United States, see GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CTR., ADAPTATION
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.georgetownclimate.org/adaptation/clearinghouse
(last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
4. Anthropogenic means that human activity is a significant cause of climate
change.
5. See, e,g., J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act:
Building Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Robin
Kundis Craig, Adapting Water Law to Public Necessity: Reframing Climate
Change Adaptation as Emergency Response and Preparedness, 11 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 709, 724 (2010) (noting the high costs that will result from a water
shortage due to climate change); Jessica Grannis, Julia Wyman, Meagan Singer,
Jena Shoaf & Colin Lynch, Coastal Management in the Face of Rising Seas:
Legal Strategies for Connecticut, 5 SEA GRANT L. & POL’Y J. 59 (2012)
(detailing local and state policy approaches to mitigate the impacts of sea-level
rise); Victor B. Flatt, Adapting Laws for a Changing World: A Systemic
Approach to Climate Change Adaptation, 64 FLA. L. REV. 269 (2012).

2012]

THE CATHEDRAL ENGULFED

71

theoretical depth. Some islands, such as Maryland’s Smith Island
in the Chesapeake Bay, which has been settled since 1686, will
surely disappear.6 As has often been remarked, property and
environmental conflicts are most acute where land meets the sea.7
Not only do coastal areas present acute conflicts about balancing
development and environmental protection, but the property rules
and regulatory regimes regarding water and land differ markedly
even though these natural elements are constantly interacting.8
Judicial reports and law reviews are strewn with analyses of bitter
disputes between collective action and individual interests in
coastal regions.9 Sea-level rise adds a vigorous catalyst to this
already bubbling brew.
This Article focuses on regulatory takings law for its
consideration of adaptation to sea-level rise. It does so even though
regulatory initiatives for adapting to sea-level rise are in their
infancy. Thus, the Article addresses general, proposed approaches
to land-use regulation under discussion, rather than concrete
regulatory initiatives under active conflict.10 This approach may
seem to put the cart before the horse; however, discussion of
regulatory takings problems posed by regulatory adaptation to sealevel rise is already occurring and is an appropriate topic of this

6. See Ben Giles, Scientists Warn of Smith Island’s Demise, Residents Are
Skeptical, THE BAY BEAT (Apr. 20, 2010), http://chesapeakebay.umd.edu/
article/scientists-warn-smith-islands-demise-residents-are-skeptical.
7. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and
Sovereignty in Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine,
71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 647 (1986) (noting the public trust doctrine’s historic
focus on navigable waters).
8. Residents of low-lying, economically disadvantaged countries are likely
to suffer far more grievous harm than will residents of the United States.
Although legal adaptation measures in such areas are beyond the domestic focus
of this Article, vulnerable residents of places like Bangladesh deserve the
world’s attention.
9. See generally Whaler’s Vill. Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 220 Cal.
Rptr. 2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (concerning the right to protect one’s property and
the state’s right to limit coastal development); McQueen v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (concerning a property owner’s right to
protect his land being overridden by the public trust doctrine); Niki L. Pace,
Wetlands or Seawalls? Adapting Shoreline Regulations to Sea Level Rise and
Wetland Preservation in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 327
(2011) (examining the policy options available in the face of sea-level rise).
10. For greater discussion of land-use regulatory approaches, see J. Peter
Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW OF ADAPTATION
TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 267–306; JESSICA GRANNIS, ADAPTATION
TOOL KIT: SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL LAND USE (2011), http://www.george
townclimate.org/resources/adaptation-tool-kit-sea-level-rise-and-coastal-land-use.
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Article for several reasons.11 First, regulatory takings concerns are
already central to discussions about the type of regulatory
approaches that may be taken to address sea-level rise. Property
owners disadvantaged by legal changes are quick to claim takings,
and regulators are generally deterred by anxiety about takings
litigation and liability. Thus, greater clarity about constitutional
limits can guide regulatory choices or answer critics. Second,
consideration of some new regulatory approaches needed to cope
with sea-level rise highlights some of the absurdities of much of
the regulatory takings doctrine. Insofar as the Supreme Court’s
conservative majority has pursued an ideal of essential, or natural,
property rights unchangeable without compensation, the dynamic
physical transformations promised by sea-level rise show the need
for a more lenient and flexible constitutional approach recognizing
that property rules do and must evolve in accord with social and
ecological change.12
A central theme in this Article is the conceptual challenge
posed by the dimension of time. Legal change to address future
problems is inherently problematic, particularly when it entails
immediate costs. This has played out in spades in political battles
over efforts to reduce greenhouse gases but is a familiar issue in
environmental law generally. Although sea-level rise is already
occurring and legal efforts to adapt to it have begun, it will have
far greater impact in the future. While such future sea-level rise is
a near certainty, its pace and dimension can only be estimated.
Thus, regulators may need to act based upon scientific predictions
before concrete harms galvanize public opinion.
This Article also seeks to show that the futurity of harm creates
opportunities for gradual and adaptive regulations, which can
minimize harms and takings compensation requirements. A central
thesis is that regulations adopted now, but having their principal
regulatory effect only in the future upon the occurrence of some
event, will create a dynamic legal response to increasing sea-level
rise. Such dynamic regulations have the potential to provide
11. The pioneering work in the field is James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal
Erosion, and the Takings Clause: How to Save Wetlands and Beaches Without
Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV. 1279 (1998). More recent thoughtful
articles include Margaret E. Peloso & Margaret R. Caldwell, Dynamic Property
Rights: The Public Trust Doctrine and Takings in a Changing Climate, 30
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 51 (2011); Pace, supra note 9; Meg Caldwell & Craig Holt
Segall, No Day at the Beach: Sea Level Rise, Ecosystem Loss, and Public Access
Along the California Coast, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533 (2007).
12. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature,
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433
(1993).
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effective environmental and social protections, to minimize harm
to property owners, to preserve the public fisc, and to shape legal
expectations appropriately. The Article thus presents four
suggestions for regulatory architecture that employ this temporal
dimension in legal adaptation to sea-level rise.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews the threat that
sea-level rise poses to coastal resources. This involves both what
can be said about how fast the seas will rise and what physical
effects such rise will entail, as well as the economic and
environmental consequences of such rise. Part II describes the
chief types of regulatory responses to sea-level rise that can be
anticipated and also presents the distinctive regulatory takings
issues that each type of regulatory response can be expected to
generate. While an infinite number of adaptations are conceivable,
legal adaptations fall into a few discernable categories, each of
which generates different regulatory takings problems. How these
regulatory takings issues are resolved may determine how much
each regulatory approach can be successfully implemented to
minimize overall environmental, economic, and social harm. This
Article argues that the most fruitful environmental response to sealevel rise is a retreat from the rising seas, i.e., development
regulations that prevent most new construction and rebuilding in
the zones most affected by sea-level rise. Retreat, however, also
raises the most troubling takings issues. Thus, Part III of the
Article presents possible approaches that conscientious regulators
can take to encourage or mandate retreat while minimizing takings
risks or liability. Each approach exploits the temporal dimension in
sea-level rise—enacting legal changes now to facilitate more
effective adaptation in the future as waters mount higher and storm
surges come further inland.
I. SEA-LEVEL RISE
A. Rate and Projections
Rising seas will inundate low-lying coastal lands and increase
the magnitude and frequency of storms. These forces will also
combine to increase the erosion of coastal land. Together with the
related problem of coastal subsidence, these forces threaten to
destroy both development and environmental resources.
Sea levels are rising now at an accelerating rate and are
projected to rise to levels that will inflict significant damage to
human society. Over the past several years, the available data and
modeling related to sea-level rise have significantly improved,
allowing better predictions of ground conditions for the year
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2100.13 The projected sea-level rise has the potential to impact
infrastructure seriously and adversely and may do so in ways that
are currently impossible to predict. Evidence supports the
possibility of abrupt climate events that could drastically worsen
predictions. Indeed, one of the most alarming aspects of climate
change is that it may contribute, along with other human-caused
stresses on ecological systems, to a planetary “state shift” or
tipping point, which may lead to sudden and dramatic changes in
natural functions.14
Sea-level rise has been tracked since the late 1800s by tidelevel gauges, and since 1993 changes have been recorded with
high precision from altimeter satellites.15 Consistent with the
hypothesis of anthropogenic climate change, i.e., that human
activity significantly contributes to it, the spread of
industrialization and increasing emissions of greenhouse gases
correlates with an accelerating increase in sea-level rise since this
metric was first recorded. A recent study, for example, found an
increasing rate of sea-level rise in recent years: from 1950 to 1993
it averaged 1.7 mm/year, while in the period from 1993 to 2009 it
averaged 3.3 mm/year.16 The increase can be traced primarily to
the expansion of water as it warms and the melting of ice sheets.
As global temperatures rise, the average ocean temperature also
rises, and according to basic scientific principles, the volume of the
heated water expands. This expansion has been estimated to
account for approximately 30% of sea-level rise over the most
recent period of measurements from 1993 to 2009.17 The melting
of polar and glacial ice has accelerated in pace with the increase in
global temperatures. From 1993 to 2009, polar and glacial ice
melting is estimated to contribute approximately 30% to sea-level

13. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at http://downloads.global
change.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf (aggregating data from a
variety of scientific papers to arrive at more accurate predictions for sea-level
rise).
14. See Anthony Barnosky et al., Approaching a State Shift in Earth’s
Biosphere, 486 NATURE 52 (2012).
15. Robert J. Nicholls & Anny Cazenave, Sea-level Rise and Its Impact on
Coastal Zones, 328 SCI. MAG. 1517 (2010); John A. Church & Neil J. White,
Sea-level Rise from the Late 19th to Early 21st Century, 32 SURV. GEOPHYSICS
585 (2011) [hereinafter Late 19th to Early 21st]; John A. Church & Neil J.
White, A 20th Century Acceleration in Global Sea-Level Rise, 33 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS L01602 (2006).
16. Late 19th to Early 21st, supra note 15; Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note
15, at 1517.
17. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 15, at 1517.
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rise.18 By the year 2100, this melting is expected to accelerate and
ultimately contribute to 60%.19
Estimates of future sea-level rise depend on models projecting
historic trends based on hypotheses about its causes. While sealevel rise clearly is accelerating, the rate of its future increases
must remain uncertain. Researchers have varied in their projections
as to the amount of sea-level rise that will take place by 2100. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) foundational
2007 report projected maximum sea-level rise of .59m. An
aggregation of studies postdating the IPCC report indicates that the
range for possible sea-level rise is much higher than .59m and by
some estimates could reach close to 2m.20
While sea-level rise will be a global phenomenon, localities
around the world and in the U.S. are likely to experience more rise
than others. California is projected to experience sea-level rise
ranging from 1.02m to 1.46m. The Gulf Coast is expected to
experience sea-level rise in the range of .8m to 1.4m, depending on
the model used.21 A recent study of a sea-level rise “hotspot” in the
Northeast, where rates well above global averages have been
observed, suggests that complex changes in oceanic currents may
lead to dramatically higher sea-level rise on that coastline.22 New
York City estimates that with rapid ice melting, it could face sealevel rise of more than seven meters.23
The above estimates of sea-level rise generally assume normal
or linear changes in natural functions. However, other unseen
factors or catastrophic changes in natural systems could drastically
accelerate sea-level rise. The largest unknown factor is the
behavior of ice sheets. Should significant decreases in ice-sheet
volume occur, sea-level rise could be measured in tens of feet
rather than by fractions of feet.24 Another climatic change that
could affect sea-level rise is the potential decrease in strength of
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1518.
20. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 25; Mark F.
Meier et al., Glaciers Dominate Eustatic Sea-Level Rise in the 21st Century, 317
SCI. MAG. 1064 (2007).
21. Joseph F. Donoghue, Sea Level History of the Northern Gulf of Mexico
Coast and Sea Level Rise Scenarios for the Near Future, 107 CLIMATIC CHANGE
17, 27 (2011).
22. Asbury H. Sallenger, Jr., Kara S. Doran & Peter A. Howd, Hotspot of
Accelerated Sea Level Rise on the Atlantic Coast of North America, NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE (June 24, 2012), http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/
vaop/ncurrent/pdf/nclimate1597.pdf.
23. N.Y.C. PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE RISK INFORMATION 53
(2009), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2009/NPCC_CRI.pdf.
24. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13.
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oceanic circulation in the North Atlantic. Circulation is predicted
to decrease 25% to 30% in the upcoming century. Accordingly, sea
levels are expected to rise due to a decrease in heat transfer. While
these changes are ill understood and not well modeled, it is
predicted that a complete collapse in circulation would result in at
least a .76m increase in sea-level rise.25
The above projections only incorporate an increase in water
levels and do not incorporate the impact of land subsidence.
Climate change will interact with and contribute to territorial
subsidence, which will exacerbate the coastal land loss. Subsidence
is a complex phenomenon to which human actions contribute.
Engineering of rivers and reduced flows may decrease sediment
deposition, while groundwater depletion may exacerbate natural
subsidence. A recent study examined the impact of groundwater
depletion, concluding that approximately 42% of sea-level change
can be attributed to withdrawals of water from terrestrial aquifers,
which cannot be naturally replenished at a pace equal to the
withdrawal rate.26 Louisiana is a poster child for loss of coastal
land due to combined subsidence and sea-level rise. Construction
of flood-control levees and dredging of deep navigation channels
have cut off flows of sediments from river to delta and have
contributed to the loss of 1,900 square miles of Louisiana’s coastal
wetlands during the past century.27 Louisiana continues to lose 25
to 35 square miles of wetlands each year28 and is projected to lose
up to 51 square miles of wetlands per year if significant corrective
actions are not taken.29

25. Id.
26. Yadu N. Pokhrel et al., Model Estimates of Sea-Level Change Due to
Anthropogenic Impacts on Terrestrial Water Storage, 5 NATURE GEOSCIENCE
389 (2012). While this metric incorporates the mitigating effect of artificial
sequestration (e.g., reservoirs), groundwater depletion has increased at a steady
rate while reservoir impoundment of water has leveled off. Coastal cities such as
Tokyo are already experiencing subsidence of up to 5 m. Nicholls & Cazenave,
supra note 15, at 1518.
27. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 149.
28. Louisiana Begins Wetland Repair with Mississippi River Sediment,
ENV’T NEWS SERV. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/apr
2009/2009-04-14-093.asp. See also Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal
Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1983).
29. COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST 87 (2012),
available at http://www.lacpra.org/assets/docs/2012%20Master%20Plan/Final%
20Plan/2012%20Coastal%20Master%20Plan.pdf.
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B. Consequences
The consequences of the projected sea-level rise can be
grouped into three categories: environmental, social, and
economic. Primarily environmental consequences consist in the
loss of coastal islands, wetlands, and sand dunes to rising waters.
These coastal lands provide essential habitat and ecological
services such as water purification and storm protection.30 A 1m
increase in sea level would inundate approximately 65% of U.S.
coastal marshlands, an ecosystem home to numerous endangered
species that also provides a protective barrier for inland areas from
wave action and storms.31 Sea-level rise poses similar threats to the
health of coral reefs.32 Increasingly large levels of saltwater
intrusions into local aquifers can also be expected, contaminating
the water supply for both humans and coastal flora–fauna
dependent on freshwater.33
Societal impacts of sea-level rise largely stem from much of
the United States population living near the coast. The residences
of approximately 3.7 million people would be inundated if sea
levels were to rise by one meter.34 Nearly 23 million people live
within six meters of the mean high tide line. If these people are not
inundated during this century, they will be exposed to greater risk
of flooding in storms.35 Sea water incursions and storm surges may
salinate freshwater supplies, causing more dislocation.36
30. Ecological services are the benefits conferred on humans by the natural
functioning of ecosystems and are often taken for granted because they need not
be purchased in the market. See generally NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL
DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (G.R. Daily ed., 1997); James
Salzman, A Field of Green? The Past and Future of Ecosystem Services, 21 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006).
31. Donoghue, supra note 21, at 27. More recent studies have been broadly
consistent with figures from past reports, finding a 44% loss of wetlands by
2080 from a 72 cm rise in sea level. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM,
COASTAL SENSITIVITY TO SEA-LEVEL RISE: A FOCUS ON THE MID-ATLANTIC
REGION 64 (2009), available at http://www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/
sap4-1/final-report/sap4-1-final-report-all.pdf.
32. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, supra note 31, at 182.
33. Id. at 21.
34. Benjamin H. Strauss et al., Tidally Adjusted Estimates of Topographic
Vulnerability to Sea Level Rise and Flooding for the Contiguous United States,
7 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS (2012), http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014
033/pdf/1748-9326_7_1_014033.pdf.
35. Id.
36. Grant Ferguson, Vulnerability of Coastal Aquifers to Groundwater Use
and Climate Change, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 342 (2012). The
combination of sea water incursions and reduced fresh water flows, due to
drought, recently have required some communities in Louisiana to forgo use of
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California’s Sacramento–San Joaquin River Delta (with its
network of rivers, levees, and dams), the center of the state’s water
infrastructure, has been assessed as “unsustainable” by state
authorities, given the projected increase in sea-level rise and
decline in precipitation over the next century.37 Displacement of so
many people, even if gradual, will be traumatic. Moreover, social
conflict over managing such changes will become a persistent
feature of local, state, and national political life.
In addition to environmental and social impacts, sea-level rise
will produce serious economic consequences. For example, the
State of New York has approximately $2.3 trillion in insured
coastal property.38 New York City alone has 33,000 buildings,
worth $18.3 billion, in the historic 100-year flood zone.39 Norfolk,
Virginia, a dynamic regional employment center, anticipates
needing $1 billion over the next 30 years to construct floodgates
and drains because of current and anticipated sea-level rise and
land subsidence.40
The economic impact of sea-level rise could wreak havoc on
the country’s infrastructure and cripple the economy. For example,
sea-level rise threatens six out of the country’s top ten freight
gateways (measured by value of shipments).41 In the Gulf Coast

their normal water supplies and purchase water from New Orleans, which itself
is threatened with future salination. See Richard Rainey, Saltwater Wedge
Reaches Chalmette: Plaquemines Buys N.O. Water, NOLA.COM (Aug. 15, 2012,
6:56 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/08/saltwater_wedge_
reaches_chalme.html.
37. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., DELTA RISK MGMT. STRATEGY, FINAL
PHASE 1 RISK REPORT: SECTION 14 (RISK ANALYSIS FOR FUTURE YEARS) 29
(2009), available at http://www.water.ca.gov/floodsafe/fessro/levees/drms/docs/
Risk_Report_Section_14_Final.pdf.
38. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 109.
39. Jeroen C. J. H. Aerts & W. J. Wouter Botzen, Managing Exposure to
Flooding in New York City, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 377 (2012). The 100year flood zone is an area which has a 1% chance of flooding in any one year.
Robert R. Holmes, Jr. & Karen Dinicola, U.S. Geological Survey, 100-Year
Flood—It’s All About Chance (2010), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106/
pdf/100-year-flood_041210web.pdf.
40. See Darryl Fears, Built on Sinking Ground, Norfolk Tries to Hold Back Tide
amid Sea-Level Rise, WASH. POST (June 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/national/health-science/built-on-sinking-ground-norfolk-tries-to-hold-back-tideamid-sea-level-rise/2012/06/17/gJQADUsxjV_story.html.
Norfolk’s
planning
comes against a state political background in which legislators refused to use the
words “sea-level rise” or “climate change” in legislation authorizing a study of such
phenomena. Id.
41. Nicholls & Cazenave, supra note 15, at 62. Of the county’s top ten
freight gateways, the ports of JFK International Airport, Los Angeles, New
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alone, thousands of miles of roadways and hundreds of freight
railways are in jeopardy of being permanently flooded due to sealevel rise.42 Aside from transportation infrastructure, a significant
portion of the country’s energy infrastructure is positioned in
coastal areas, and sea-level rise will result in direct losses from
equipment damage and high relocation or armoring costs to protect
these facilities. Tourism infrastructure will also be heavily
damaged, resulting in local economic depressions for communities
that depend heavily on the industry. Many beachfront homes will
be inundated.43
C. Property Rights and Sea-Level Rise
Sea-level rise will change property boundaries. Unimpeded,
rising sea levels will divest private property owners and shift
ownership to the public as sea water slowly inundates formerly dry
land. This is the background legal reality that shapes analysis of
the property rights and takings implications of regulatory
strategies.
Under the law of every state, the land under the sea essentially
belongs to the public.44 The public trust doctrine, with roots in
Roman law and English common law, currently composed of both
state and federal common law, as well as constitutional elements,
provides for public rights over the bed and banks of navigable

York, Long Beach, Los Angeles International Airport, and Houston are
vulnerable to sea-level rise.
42. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, supra note 13, at 62. California’s
transportation infrastructure is similarly at risk. MATTHEW HEBERGER ET AL.,
CAL. CLIMATE CHANGE CTR., THE IMPACTS OF SEA-LEVEL RISE ON THE
CALIFORNIA COAST 54 (2009), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/
sea_level_rise/report.pdf.
43. Admittedly, some previously inland homes will acquire direct beach access,
although of uncertain value. As Hurricane Katrina showed, the consequences of sealevel rise are likely to have a disparate impact upon low-income communities that
lack the resources to adapt, recover, or escape. The United States is less at risk than
other countries because of its geography and wealth. In Bangladesh, many of its 158
million impoverished citizens live within 20 feet of sea level; the government
estimates that 20 million people will need to be resettled as soon as 2050. Dan
Morrison, Come Hell with High Water, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2012, 7:36 AM), http://
latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/bangladesh-faces-environmental-calamity-ifcarbon-emissions-arent-cut. The challenges of adaptation in the United States,
though daunting, are quite manageable by comparison.
44. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
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waters and tidelands.45 These public rights include access for
navigation, fishing, and often recreation, as well as for
environmental protection.46 At the coast, the public’s rights
generally extend up to the mean high-tide line.47 The public trust is
broad and vague, but it provides the public with property rights
superior to any private owner on the lands and waters to which it
applies.48
As rising seas move the line between public tidelands and
private dry lands farther upland, private owners will lose land to
the public as it becomes subject to tidal wash. This is the effect of
the ancient doctrine of accretion, which provides that slow or
imperceptible changes in physical boundaries set by water courses
change legal ownership.49 A sudden, perceptible change in a water
boundary, known as avulsion, does not change ownership, which
remains at the line of the prior physical boundary.50 Sea-level rise
is incremental, and therefore, corresponding land loss will be
subject to the doctrine of accretion and will deprive private land
owners of their property rights in the inundated lands.51 Thus,
under existing law, sea-level rise, which generally proceeds slowly
and incrementally, will deprive littoral owners of land ownership.
Accretionary loss has never been considered a taking,
constitutionally requiring public compensation, because nature,
rather than the state, effects the deprivation. Loss of littoral land
through accretion might be understood to be a risk that “inheres in
the title” to such land.52
45. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles:
Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699
(2006).
46. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
47. Pace, supra note 9.
48. See J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green
Property, A Future Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915 (2012).
49. See Joseph L. Sax, The Accretion/Avulsion Puzzle: Its Past Revealed, Its
Future Proposed, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 305 (2010).
50. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 366–67 (1892).
51. Coastline movement due to storms, even though sudden and, thus,
avulsion, also moves property lines. As the Texas Supreme Court held that
public easements cannot move inland due to avulsion, it affirmed that the line
between public trust and private uplands did move due to the same events.
Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]hile losing
property to the public trust as it becomes part of the wet beach or submerged
under the ocean is an ordinary hazard of ownership for coastal property owners,
it is far less reasonable, and unsupported by ancient common law precepts, to
hold that a public easement can suddenly encumber an entirely new portion of a
landowner’s property or a different landowner’s property that was not
previously subject to that right of use.”).
52. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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That sea-level rise will, over time, deprive owners of their
littoral property without compensation is an important background
principle in assessing whether regulation of property use before the
sea-level rise should be considered a taking. Owners have every
incentive to block such loss by armoring their property with seawalls, but such structures will deprive the public of their right to
new public trust lands and cause a variety of other harms. The
prospect of uncompensated loss also changes what can be
considered the “property as a whole” under the standard approach
to identifying a regulatory taking. As the rate of sea-level rise
becomes clearer and more broadly understood, it will affect littoral
land’s market price, generally lowering it. Such land may become
uninsurable. In assessing whether a regulation reduces the
economic value of littoral land, the economic effects of the
regulation must be distinguished from the economic effects of sealevel rise itself.53
Are the rules of accretion and avulsion subject to legislative
change to perpetuate the ownership rights of upland property
owners? State legislatures might provide through statute that
upland owners retain ownership rights despite being submerged,
abrogating the traditional understanding of accretion. To be sure,
the accretion–avulsion rules may be criticized as excessively
formalistic. They developed long ago under quite different
economic and environmental conditions and before modern
surveying methods.54 Coastal land in pre-modern times did not
enjoy a premium because of leisure amenities. Most
conspicuously, the doctrine of accretion seemed fair when it was
assumed that waters could rise or fall in equal probability, so that a
littoral owner could be advantaged at one time and disadvantaged
at another.55 Climate-induced sea-level rise ensures that littoral
owners will be net losers from accretion for the foreseeable future,
undermining the justice of the rule. The accretion and avulsion
doctrines seem to be merely common law solutions for the
practical problem of ascertaining boundaries after physical change
obliterates former boundaries. These two concepts apparently
enjoy no constitutional status that would immunize them from
legislative reform.
On the other hand, abrogating the rules of accretion for littoral
owners would deprive the public of the traditional right of access
53. On the other hand, land saved from sea-level rise through public
armoring may see a relative increase in market value, although this would be
attributable to the public subsidizing of levees or other works.
54. Sax, supra note 49, at 320.
55. See infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.
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to the shoreline provided under the public trust doctrine. Such a
change would prospectively prevent the public from accessing
tidelands or submerged lands even though those rights always have
been tied to the physical condition of such water boundaries.
Arguably, such tidelands are far better suited and more valuable
for public access than for private ownership or use.56 Although the
Takings Clause would not protect public land against a taking for
private use, a provocative asymmetry, most states’ public trust
doctrines have established limits against alienation of public trust
lands not for public trust ends.57 Such a limitation could invalidate
a rule aimed at preventing the expected increase of public trust
lands through accretion, although that raises the long-standing
ambiguity of whether the public trust doctrine is constitutional
under a state’s law. In any event, the public may oppose such
elimination of public rights.
Also, the Supreme Court has given precedence to the doctrines
of accretion and avulsion over statutory changes in the context of
takings challenges. In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection, the Court upheld the
Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that Florida’s Beachfront
Management Act did not change the rights of littoral owners
because the statute duplicated the results that the doctrine of
avulsion already provided.58 It is striking that the Court gave so
much weight to this obscure common law principle rather than
assessing the underlying statute’s inherent fairness or rationality.
As I have written elsewhere, the turn to common law essentialism
in regulatory takings doctrine threatens to perpetuate outdated rules
and divert attention from whether statutes address new
environmental challenges in accord with basic fairness.59 Thus,
judicial conservatism probably will retain the accretion–avulsion
distinction simply because it has endured for a long time.

56. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
57. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (holding
legislature’s conveyance away of public trust land beneath navigable waters
ineffective).
58. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592 (2010). This decision is considered more fully below in the section
addressing soft armoring of the coastline.
59. J. Peter Byrne, Rising Seas and Common Law Baselines: A Comment on
Regulatory Takings Discourse Concerning Climate Change, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
625, 642 (2010).
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D. Market Mechanisms; Flood Insurance
This Article concentrates on land-use regulation and other
forms of government mandates to adapt to sea-level rise, both
because such regulation is indispensible for reasonable problems,
and because it is a precondition for the Takings Clause analysis at
its center. However, this Article does not purport to slight
cooperative and market mechanisms, which can have great value in
certain situations, at least when market incentives provide support
to public-spirited motivation. Private owners may manage their
land so as to protect environmental or other collective values.
Private organizations, such as land trusts, or state and local
governments, may purchase land or conservation easements to
promote ecological services under new coastal conditions. Such
activity has great value because it avoids coercion and can proceed
in advance of the formation of political majorities responding to
crisis. But such activity is generally incentivized by tax breaks and
other public payments, which make such private actions more
economically plausible. However, there will never be enough
money to incentivize voluntary adaption on a scale necessary to
cope with sea-level rise. Moreover, in some circumstances, basic
social morality is undermined when payments are made to a
landowner simply because that landowner has chosen not to
engage in development that harms life or ecosystems.60
Broad political support should exist for the abolition of public
subsidies that exacerbate the risks of sea-level rise. Reform of the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), seems the most
obvious and urgent legal step to adapt to sea-level rise.61 The NFIP
was enacted because private insurers were fleeing the market due
to catastrophic losses from storms and flooding. It provides federal
insurance against such hazards at submarket rates in exchange for
local adoption of building codes and land-use measures thought to
lessen storm and flood risks. The NFIP has grown to a massive
special interest that has promoted excessive land development of
coastal areas by socializing the risks of private building by the sea.
60. See John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to
Protect the Environment, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES ENVTL. L. 1 (2005).
61. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM: FACTORS AFFECTING ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS (2009),
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/106xx/doc
10620/11-04-floodinsurance.pdf; JUSTIN R. PIDOT, COASTAL DISASTER
INSURANCE IN THE ERA OF GLOBAL WARMING: THE CASE FOR RELYING ON THE
PRIVATE MARKET (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1695697.

84

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

The local-government development restrictions required by the
NFIP are inadequate even without the increased risks of climate
change. Even more alarming, the flood maps used to assess risks
do not in any way take into account the certainty of future sea-level
rise. Federal law has required that flood maps be calculated only
on historic flood experiences and does not permit FEMA to take
into account scientific models predicting increased future flooding
due to climate change and other factors.
Congress very recently enacted legislation reforming some
aspects of NFIP.62 The statute directs FEMA to revise flood maps
based upon “future changes in sea levels, precipitation, and
intensity of hurricanes”63 and to develop recommendations about
how to incorporate climate change into regulatory maps.64 It may
not grant FEMA the authority to actually affect development
decisions, such as adjusting flood insurance premiums based upon
the increased risk due to sea-level rise.65 Nonetheless, the Act does
allow FEMA to develop more realistic flood maps, which local
governments can use in crafting land-use regulations. Also, the Act
phases out insurance subsidies for new homes, second homes, and
properties subject to repetitive loss, and allows FEMA to raise
premiums across the board to higher (but still capped)
maximums.66 The Act, while imperfect to be sure, demonstrates
the capacity for Congress to enact legislation to eliminate subsidies
for nonsensical behavior in light of sea-level rise. It was a small
price to pay for constructive legislation that all references to
climate change were eliminated from the Act’s language in the
final conference.67
Reforming flood insurance shows how market incentives can
promote land use adaptation to sea-level rise without incurring
taking problems. Eliminating insurance subsidies requires coastal
residents to bear more of the real costs of doing so. Such costs
62. Biggert–Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112141, 126 Stat. 405 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001–4129). See also
Jessica Grannis, Analysis of How the Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 (H.R.
4348) May Affect State and Local Adaptation Efforts, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE
CTR. (2012), http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/Analysis%20
of%20the%20Flood%20Insurance%20Reform%20Act%20of%202012.pdf.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 100216(b)(3)(D) (2012).
64. Id. § 100216.
65. See id. § 100211 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 4015). FEMA may still only
establish insurance premiums based upon consideration of the “average
historical loss year.” Id.
66. Id. § 100205 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 4014 & 4015(e)).
67. See Evan Lehmann, ‘Global Warming’ Disappears from Flood
Legislation, CLIMATEWIRE (July 3, 2012), available at http://rstreet.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/flood-climate.pdf.
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should encourage retreat from rising seas and the choice to live
further inland.
II. ADAPTATION TO SEA-LEVEL RISE AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
This Part of the Article seeks to identify the takings issues
raised by each type of regulatory response to sea-level rise. There
are three possible regulatory responses to sea-level rise: defense,
retreat, or accommodation. The first two already have and will
continue to present significant regulatory takings issues. The third,
accommodation, refers to building codes that require structures to
be raised or reinforced to withstand floodwaters.68 Such building
codes frequently reside in local regulations designed to meet the
NFIP’s requirements. These requirements have not given rise to
takings claims and, as safety rules that expressly permit
development, are unlikely to do so.
Defense and retreat measures both engage property rights and
present challenging, if different, regulatory takings issues. This
Part will explain the purposes of and mechanisms for defense and
retreat measures and then explicate the takings issues that each
generates. Neither is different from regulatory steps taken in the
past to address flooding or erosion, but the scale and ubiquity of
sea-level rise will require their deployment to a degree that should
stimulate fresh thinking about both regulatory design and the
nature of constitutional protection for private property. Part III of
this Article will propose time-triggered approaches to retreat
regulations that seek a new balance between collective protections
and private rights.
Before considering the variety of regulatory responses to sealevel rise, a brief general introduction to the Takings Clause may
be helpful. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”69 It was intended to condition the
exercise of eminent domain on compensation.70 Understandably, it
was extended to require compensation when the government
otherwise physically takes possession of property without the
formalities of condemnation71 and was applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.72 In modern times, courts
68. GRANNIS, supra note 10, at 23.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
70. See William Michael Treanor, The Original Meaning of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).
71. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
72. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S.
226 (1897).
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have established that regulation of property use, without any
dispossession, can amount to a taking if the economic
consequences to the owner are severe enough.73 This regulatory
takings doctrine provides far and away the most significant
constitutional limitation on state and local land-use regulatory
authority.
The Supreme Court’s 1978 Penn Central decision canonized
an ad hoc, fact-sensitive approach to determining whether a
regulation effects a regulatory taking.74 The Court upheld New
York City’s historic preservation law, which prohibited the owner
from adding a massive modernist tower above iconic Grand
Central Station. The opinion balanced the economic injury to the
owner, especially the degree to which the regulation frustrated its
reasonable investment-backed expectations, with the character and
purpose of the government’s actions. Subsequently, the Court
established two circumstances in which a regulation can effect a
taking per se, that is, without any balancing of competing factors:
when a regulation authorizes a permanent physical invasion75 and
when it deprives the owner of all economic value.76 Critics argue
that the regulatory takings doctrine lacks persuasive basis in the
Constitution’s language, history, or early interpretation.77
Nonetheless, property rights advocates and several sympathetic
Supreme Court Justices have striven to expand the doctrine’s reach
and strength to become a primary substantive limitation on
government power over private property.78 All of this is relevant to
understanding how the judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause
may shape legal adaptation to sea-level rise.
A. Hard Armoring
The prospect of fighting back against sea-level rise may invoke
images of ancient King Canute ordering back the sea, a persistent
icon of human and governmental futility.79 Yet there have been
73. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
74. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
76. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
77. See generally, e.g., Byrne, supra note 48; Treanor, supra note 70; Sax,
supra note 49; Lazarus, supra note 2; Echeverria, supra note 60.
78. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that any net diminution in value
requires compensation); James S. Burling, Private Property Rights and the
Environment After Palazzolo, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2002).
79. Contrary to how the Canute story is usually interpreted, the King may
have intended to convey to his followers the limits of governmental power. See
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notable successes in building structures to protect or reclaim dry
land from the sea and from flood waters. Building structures to
hold back the sea generally is referred to as armoring. Such
structures can consist of construction materials, such as steel and
concrete used in levees and bulkheads, which are referred to as
hard armoring. They may also employ natural and living materials
to build or restore beaches, sand dunes, or wetlands, in which case
they are referred to as soft armoring.80
Both forms of armoring interpose higher elements to shield dry
land from sea water, and both involve significant expense in
engineering, constructing, and maintaining structures that can
withstand the pressures of nature. Plainly, armoring the entire coast
will never be economically feasible or even rational.81 Levees will
certainly protect areas of intense development, like Manhattan, and
beaches valuable for recreation and tourism will be restored.
Armoring most of the shoreline, however, cannot be justified.
Moreover, armoring causes significant environmental harms. Hard
armoring will eliminate the intertidal area as seas rise, and it often
increases erosion of neighboring properties by increasing current
and wave action laterally against unprotected shorelines. Soft
armoring causes less environmental harm because it mimics
natural shorelines, but its capacity to preserve ecological services
performed by natural shorelines has not been clearly established.82
Each method of armoring performs differently under different
environmental conditions. While each raises takings problems, the
issues that they raise seem quite different.
Hard armoring can be accomplished by either private or public
action. Private property owners can construct bulkheads on the
seaward boundaries to reclaim land or to shield development from
sea water. Private armoring in itself does not threaten any taking
because it lacks state action. It does, however, threaten tort liability
because the construction of a levee on one property may damage
neighboring land by redirecting or intensifying wave or current
action, thereby increasing erosion.83 Historically, most states have

Kathryn Westcott, Is King Canute Misunderstood?, BBC NEWS MAG. (May 26,
2011, 7:41 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13524677.
80. See Robert R.M. Verchick & Joel D. Scheraga, Protecting the Coast, in
THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 3, at 235–65.
81. See Byrne & Grannis, supra note 10.
82. See Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 80.
83. See Wendy B. Davis, Reasonable Use Has Become the Common
Enemy: An Overview of the Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Water and
the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1, 9–12
(2004) (noting that at present a large minority of states have adopted the
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held armoring owners free from liability to their eroding or flooded
neighbors under what has been termed the common enemy rule for
repelling floodwaters.84 In short, the rule provides that every
property owner can take whatever actions on his own land that he
wishes without incurring liability to neighboring owners from
causing increased flooding or other harms. Many states have taken
the more modern approach of imposing a reasonableness standard
on such self-protection.85 The serious taking issue that relates to
private armoring stems from regulations prohibiting such armoring
as a means of encouraging retreat from rising waters. That issue
will be addressed below in Part II.C.
Government-built or -authorized levees raise a variety of
takings issues.86 Some may be straightforward, such as the
expropriation of land for construction of public levees, but even
here the existence of some kinds of public easements may shield
the government from liability.87 The more interesting issues stem
from flooding caused by government action. Governmentauthorized construction that causes a permanent flooding has long
been viewed as a taking.88
Such issues have often arisen under the federal flood-control
programs. The Flood Control Act of 1928,89 under which the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers has built and manages the levee system

reasonable use doctrine regarding a property owner’s right to combat surface
waters, with another significant minority following a modified rule allowing a
finding of liability due to negligence or trespass).
84. See id. at 13.
85. It may also be that state or local permitting of armoring may violate
state public trust doctrines, because it would in some instances diminish public
trust coastal resources. Cf. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono
Lake), 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (suggesting that state recognition of water
rights may violate public trust doctrine), cert. denied sub nom. L.A. Dep't of
Water & Power v. Nat’l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). I am indebted to
Jessica Grannis for this suggestion.
86. There does seem also to be an argument that publically constructed hard
armoring may violate the public trust doctrine when it causes the destruction of
public trust tidelands through erosion. Such construction essentially transfers
property rights from the public to adjacent private owners without furthering
public trust values; indeed, they eliminate opportunities for public access over
the tidelands and undermine the environmental services that tidelands provide.
87. See Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896) (finding that Louisiana
levee easement shields from Fifth Amendment compensation requirement
expropriation of land to erect a levee).
88. See e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1872) (noting that
permanent government-authorized flooding would be considered a taking per
se); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 428 (1982).
89. 33 U.S.C §§ 701–709b (2006).
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on the Mississippi River and its tributaries, provides the United
States with immunity for tort liability for flooding resulting from
operation of the system.90 Litigants continue to test the limits of
that immunity.91 Of course, no statutory immunity can shield the
government from constitutional takings liability, so litigants seek
to characterize flooding losses attributable to government
management of the federal system as takings. This has led to stress
on the line between tort and takings. While negligent or
inadvertent government flooding of private property cannot readily
be characterized as a taking, a variety of deliberate or foreseeable
flooding may be, although such claims face a host of formal or
conceptual barriers.92
The complexities of and potential for such flooding–takings
claims can be seen in Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, a
recent decision of the Court of Federal Claims.93 Plaintiffs owned
land in the Birds Point–New Madrid Floodway in Missouri that
was deliberately flooded by the Corps, according to the established
plan for flood control, by breaching a levee to relieve flood risk to
the upstream city of Cairo, Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that the
consequent flooding destroyed crops, equipment, and
infrastructure, and also deposited substantial quantities of sand and
gravel that impair farming and cause recurring flooding from rain.
Although the United States had acquired flood easements in the
past from some landowners, the plaintiffs alleged that the flooding
here exceeded what had been provided for in the easements. In a
careful opinion, Judge Firestone applied existing precedent to
dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that the flooding did
not amount to taking because, even accepting that it reflected
deliberate government policy, it was based on a single flooding
incident. The court followed precedent providing that flooding
attributable to the government amounts to taking only if it is both
intentional and either permanent or “intermittent but inevitably
90. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2006) (“No liability of any kind shall attach to or rest
upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any
place . . . .”). See United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 608 (1986) (“Congress
clearly sought to ensure beyond doubt that sovereign immunity would protect
the Government from ‘any’ liability associated with flood control.”), abrogated
by Cent. Green Co. v. U.S., 531 U.S. 425 (2001).
91. E.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644
(E.D. La. 2009), rev’d, Nos. 10-30249, 10-31054, 11-30808, 2012 WL 4343775
(5th Cir. 2012). The earlier decision is thoughtfully critiqued in Edward P.
Richards, The Hurricane Katrina Levee Breach Litigation: Getting the First
Geoengineering Liability Case Right, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 267 (2012).
92. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. United States, 246 U.S. 146, 149–50 (1924).
93. No. 11-275L, 2012 WL 1570878 (Fed. Cl. May 4, 2012).
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recurring.”94 Plaintiffs argued that the flooding they suffered was
inevitably recurring because the Corps’s operation plan for the
river directed it to breach the levee and flood Birds Point whenever
river conditions met established standards. The court rejected this
argument based upon another precedent providing that planned
flooding can be a taking only if plaintiffs can show that it caused
more frequent flooding than would have occurred in the plan’s
absence.95 As the Supreme Court stated long ago, “The
Government has not subjected respondent’s land to any additional
flooding, above what would occur if the Government had not
acted; and the Fifth Amendment does not make the Government an
insurer that the evil of floods be stamped out universally before the
evil can be attacked at all.”96 Allegations that the plan created more
damaging—though not more frequent—flooding did not suffice.97
Big Oak Farms demonstrates the formidable doctrinal defenses
that courts have provided the United States against flooding-related
takings claims based upon flood-control efforts. The Supreme
Court has not seriously considered flooding takings in many
decades. In that time, general takings law has developed
substantially, with a conservative plurality eager to establish
greater constitutional protections for private property.98 The Court
has now granted certiorari in a flooding case, Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission v. United States, in which the Federal Circuit
found no taking because flooding was considered temporary when
Corps officials temporarily flooded a state forest during growing
season for six consecutive years.99 Given the Court’s enhanced
interest in so-called temporary takings over the past two decades,
there is a substantial chance that the Court will expand takings
liability for flooding.100 Although prior cases seem to have
established a per se rule that temporary, nonrecurring floods cannot
be takings, it would be surprising if the Court should adhere to that
perspective. The Government may be satisfied if the Court holds
only that temporary flooding should be evaluated under the fact94. Id. at *3 (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)). See
also Ridge Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
95. Big Oak Farms, 2012 WL 1570878, at *8.
96. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266 (1939).
97. Big Oak Farms, 2012 WL 1570878, at *8.
98. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995).
99. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 637 F.3d 1366, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1856 (2012).
100. See Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302 (2002); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A.,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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sensitive Penn Central test, rather than treating intentional or
foreseeable flooding as a physical occupation amounting to a per
se taking.101 The argument seems strong because a per se taking
rule threatens to erode the distinction between takings and torts.
Because some of the Justices desire to extend constitutional
protections for private property, this case will likely mandate more
frequent government liability for intentional flooding.
What does that indicate about takings liability for government
armoring of the coast? The current round of river flooding cases
may well provide the normative context within which government
management of seawalls to hold back rising seas will be viewed.
Government will be unable to erect levees everywhere rising seas
should threaten land. Choices will need to be made based on
feasibility, cost, and environmental consequences. Losers are likely
to argue that deliberate choices not to protect their property should
entitle them to compensation in a manner analogous to property
owners whose lands are flooded when seawalls to protect others
are erected or destroyed. Government cannot take property purely
by inaction. But extensive plans for seawalls that exclude certain
private parcels may be viewed by courts as a more active decision
to flood those parcels, especially if the armoring increased the
magnitude of the flood risk to intentionally unprotected land. Also,
more severe storms assaulting seawalls and levees will likely result
in more occasions in which the government must decide whether to
breach works and flood one area to protect another. Floods that
would be attributed to nature against a background of government
inaction may be charged against government when it acts to
manage them.102 The distracting issue of temporary flooding may
play a smaller role in sea-level rise flooding disputes because sealevel rise inundation will be permanent in the legal sense (although
stronger storm surges reaching farther inland will still present
temporary flooding puzzles).
Property rights advocates can place government decisions to
permit flooding of specific private land into the traditional
narrative of takings cases. Once government assumes from Nature
the authority to decide who shall be flooded and who shall be
defended, flooded property owners will claim a right to
compensation. These property owners will invoke maxims
stressing that landowners whose lands are sacrificed for the general
good are bearing “public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
101. See Brief for Respondent at 37–41, Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v.
United States, 132 S. Ct. 1856 (2012) (No. 11-597).
102. See JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE (1989).

92

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

should be borne by the public as a whole.”103 Moreover, the
government’s discretion to choose whom and where to flood may
raise the same concerns about the political influence of the wealthy
and powerful that have animated opposition to eminent domain. In
short, sea-level rise may make government decisions about
whether to armor someone’s property subject to takings claims to a
degree similar to what the U.S. Supreme Court may prescribe for
deliberate decisions to flood some land to protect or benefit other
land. Such an approach could seriously deter decisions to retreat in
the face of sea-level rise rather than to build levees because the
government would need to compensate owners for the permitted
inundation of their land.
Several powerful doctrines stand in the way of this dangerous
path. The Court has squarely ruled that government-caused
flooding does not give rise to a taking if the subject land would
have flooded under natural conditions.104 This rule would surely
protect government decisions not to armor shorelines, but it arose
at a time of greater judicial confidence in the benefits of
government management of resources. How it fares in upcoming
rounds of flooding litigation remains to be seen.
At bottom, government liability to property owners for
flooding from management of government water-control facilities
raises fundamental issues about the government’s role in
addressing environmental risks. These more foundational issues
are somewhat reflected in the case law. Long-established precedent
provides that when government must choose which entities will
suffer an unavoidable loss from a natural calamity, it does not
incur takings liability to the loser.105 As the Court wrote in
upholding a Virginia law requiring the destruction of infected
cedar trees in order to save more valuable apple trees: “When
forced to such a choice the [government] does not exceed its
constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class
of property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, is of greater value to the public.”106 Similarly, the
courts have recognized an emergency exception to normal takings
liability for government “destruction of ‘real and personal
property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a
fire’ or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of

103.
104.
105.
106.

Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 265–66 (1939).
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
Id. at 279.

2012]

THE CATHEDRAL ENGULFED

93

others.”107 These doctrines have somewhat stood on the fringes of
regulatory takings doctrine because giving them full effect would
come close to abolishing any normative foundation for regulatory
takings generally. Sea-level rise may bring them to the center of
consideration because government will be addressing a
widespread, if slow-moving, calamity that will require choosing
between where to flood and where to protect over a vast area.
While it is too early to predict how courts will resolve this
fundamental problem, it should sharpen the interest in how the
Supreme Court conceptualizes takings by deliberate flooding.
B. Soft Armoring
Soft armoring, such as beach or wetlands restoration, harms
environmental resources less than does hard armoring, because soft
armoring aims to preserve or mimic natural landscape features and
to preserve their ecological services. When successful, beach and
dune replenishment can provide barriers against storm surges and
rising seas, while engineered wetlands can also protect against
storms while creating habitat and cleaning polluted waters.108 To
be sure, such efforts are not always successful and thus pose
greater environmental risks than retreat. Moreover, such efforts can
be extremely expensive. Congress appropriated more than $100
million each year between 1997 and 2005 for beach restoration.109
The demand for beach renewal is likely to increase due to sea-level
rise and associated storm-driven erosion. Yet, the public has shown
a willingness to bear some costs for soft armoring to preserve
recreational beaches. Also, private developers have engineered
new wetlands as required mitigation for permits to fill and develop
other wetlands.110
Soft armoring presents different takings problems from hard
armoring. It does not hold back walls of water and will not be
breached intentionally to manage rising waters. Beach
replenishment does raise questions about ownership of the newly
constructed beach. Statutes authorizing beach renourishment, such
107. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 n.16 (1992)
(quoting Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18 (1880)).
108. See Verchick & Scheraga, supra note 80, at 18.
109. OFFICE OF SENATOR TOM COBURN, WASHED OUT TO SEA: HOW
CONGRESS PRIORITIZES BEACH PORK OVER NATIONAL NEEDS 11 (2009),
available at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_
id=e12c6935-f034-4d9e-b7b3-093cf98a4ff9.
110. See Compensatory Mitigation, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.
epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/wetlandsmitigation_index.cfm (last updated
Oct. 9, 2012).
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as the Florida statute considered below, understandably provide
that the public owns the new beach that it has paid to create, but
littoral owners may complain either that they should own the new
beach or that their riparian rights related to contiguity to the water
have been eliminated.
The Supreme Court may have provided a roadmap for local
governments to conduct beach restoration without takings liability
in its unanimous decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection.111 In that case,
the Court upheld a decision of the Florida Supreme Court, which
had upheld a statutorily prescribed beach restoration initiative
against takings challenges by littoral owners. The statute provided
that a restored beach would be public property and that the
boundary of the upland littoral owner would be fixed at an historic
mean high-tide line rather than moved seaward to the new-shifting
mean high-tide line.112 The upland owners argued in the state
courts that the Act deprived them of the rights to future accretions
and to have their land touch the water, but the Florida Supreme
Court held that the upland owners did not have common law
riparian rights of the dimension they claimed.113 The U.S. Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether the
state court’s alleged change in common law property rules can
effect a taking requiring the payment of just compensation.114
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court upheld the Florida Court’s
decision because it considered the beach restoration to be an
avulsion under state law (rather than an accretion), which did not
move the boundary and which effectuated under common law a
separation of the upland owner from contact with the water.115
Accordingly, the statute did not work a taking because it mimicked
the effect of the common law.
Courts have taken Stop the Beach as a green light to sustain
beach renourishment programs against takings claims.116 After all,
such projects dump dredged sand on public trust sea bottoms,
seaward of the tideline, so that no current private dry land is
appropriated or even necessarily trespassed upon. States are
111. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
112. Dennis L. Jones Beach and Shore Preservation Act, ch. 61-246, 1961
Fla. Laws (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011–.45 (Westlaw 2012)).
113. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102
(Fla. 2008), aff’d sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
114. See J. Peter Byrne, Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 619 (2011).
115. Id. at 634.
116. See, e.g., City of Long Branch v. Jui Yung Liu, 4 A.3d 542 (N.J. 2010).
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unlikely to fund beach reconstruction projects if the new beaches
are constitutionally required to be privately owned.117 Furthermore,
states are unlikely to fund beach restoration projects if states are
forced to compensate private land owners when appropriating their
land for public use. If courts can deem the construction “avulsion”
rather than “accretion,” the upland owner’s common law rights are
not at all impaired.
Yet, the doctrine of avulsion seems a slim reed upon which to
rest such large-scale public projects. Although ancient and
ubiquitous, the avulsion–accretion distinction rests on weak
normative grounds.118 It is difficult to understand why property
rights should depend on the speed and perceptibility with which a
water boundary recedes or encroaches. Moreover, the distinction
seems quite susceptible to judicial interpretation to reach desired
results post-hoc, as the degree of perceptibility necessary for
finding avulsion cannot be stated with any precision. Indeed, it
may be the best rationale for the distinction that its vagaries allow
courts to accomplish substantial justice post-hoc.119
Application of the common law doctrines of accretion and
avulsion to beach reconstruction raises additional concerns,
particularly in the era of sea-level rise. The traditional normative
rationales for the doctrines of accretion and avulsion rest on the
expectation that natural forces will unpredictably change water
boundaries in both directions. Thus, accretion often is justified by
the belief that a littoral or riparian owner will sometimes gain land
and will sometimes lose land as lands erode or accrete. Blackstone
wrote that “owners, being often losers by the breaking in of the
sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible gain is therefore a
reciprocal consideration for such possible charge or loss.”120
Similarly, sudden storms will sometimes perceptibly shift lands in
either direction. But beach reconstructions are planned, financed,
and engineered projects in which officials must take into account
ex ante what effects their construction will have upon boundaries.
Normative justifications for such projects should provide an
overall assessment of their reasonableness and distributional
117. The Texas General Land Office has refused since the decision in Severance
v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012), to fund future erosion projects in West
Galveston Bay because “[p]ublic money cannot be used to benefit only a private
land owner.” Jerry Patterson, Commissioner, Severance v. Patterson: Frequently
Asked Questions, TEX. GEN. LAND OFFICE, http://www.glo.texas.gov/what-wedo/caring-for-the-coast/_documents/open-beaches/faq-openbeaches.pdf (last visited
Oct. 11, 2012).
118. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text.
119. See Sax, supra note 49, at 344–45.
120. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *262.
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consequences rather than an invocation of obscure common law
distinctions. Moreover, despite short-term fluctuations due to
erosion and reliction, sea-level rise will move boundaries in only
one direction: inland. The accretion rule must forfeit its traditional
claim to fairness when boundaries no longer are as apt to move in
one direction as in the other.121
Courts’ consideration of regulatory takings claims for beach
reconstruction may cling for a time to the mask of avulsion but
over time needs to take a more comprehensive view of whether the
effects on upland owners are the types of losses they should bear in
all “fairness and justice.”122 Such renourishment, after all, protects
the upland owner from erosion and from sea-level rise. No takings
liability should attach to beach reconstruction so long as
deprivation of upland owners’ rights is no greater than necessary to
accomplish the project. The Florida Beach and Shore Preservation
Act guarantees littoral owners that they will have access to the
water, that no permanent structures will be erected on the new
beach, and that the moving boundary line will resume if the state
fails to maintain the reconstructed beach.123 As Justice Scalia
stated at oral argument in Stop the Beach, “I’m not sure it’s a bad
deal.”124 The Takings Clause should not require something other
than that.
C. Retreat
The environmental and economic arguments for retreat before
sea-level rise are compelling, at least for many coastal areas not
intensely developed.125 As noted above, sea-level rise presents a
problem primarily because of real estate development and
predictable efforts to defend it. Preventing or removing
development in the zone at risk for sea-level rise will reduce public
costs of defending or responding to crises and will permit natural
landscape features providing valuable ecological services to
migrate landward. Different levels of stringency will be
121. Away from the open seas, climate change will cause droughts that may
move boundaries formed by rivers and lakes in different directions.
122. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
123. FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (Westlaw 2012).
124. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, THE OYEZ PROJECT AT IIT CHICAGO-KENT COLLEGE
OF LAW, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2009/2009_08_1151 (follow
“Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental
Protection - Oral Argument” hyperlink; then follow “Full Transcript Text”
hyperlink) (last visited September 10, 2012).
125. See Byrne & Grannis, supra note 10.
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appropriate for different areas, depending on their current and
planned levels of development, their foreseeable proximity to
rising waters, their suitability for hosting future ecological services
as natural features seek to migrate, and other appropriate planning
considerations.
Most land-use regulations are devised and implemented by
local governments pursuant to delegated state authority.126 Many
states have created state-level agencies to plan and regulate land
use near the coasts. The divisions of authority between localities
and states in coastal areas can create complex problems of legal
authority.127 Nonetheless, states and their localities have ample
authority to implement regulations to address sea-level rise.128
Land-use regulations can mandate or encourage retreat of
development by prohibiting, limiting, or conditioning new
development or rebuilding.
Efforts to enact such regulations will surely be resisted
politically by those whose property or investments are harmed by
them, as well as by local governments dependent on increased real
estate taxes in the short term. Threats of takings liability will
influence legislative decisions. Also, private property owners
losing in the political process will likewise press regulatory takings
claims. Part II.C considers existing law as it relates to various
regulatory approaches to retreat and also discusses several means
for governments seeking to effectuate retreat to avoid or limit
takings liability.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council is the touchstone for
considering the regulatory takings consequences of retreat
regulation.129 While that well-known and perennially controversial
decision has been whittled down in direct application by
subsequent decisions, it has shaped beachfront regulation in the
face of sea-level rise. In Lucas, South Carolina’s Beachfront
Management Act of 1988 attempted to implement a retreat strategy
in response to past storm damage and studies of future sea-level
126. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(describing and upholding against constitutional challenge traditional local
zoning); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (“Regulation of
land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”).
127. Recent examples of state legislation addressing sea-level rise include
Maryland’s Living Shoreline Protection Act of 2008, MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §
16-201 (Westlaw 2012), and Connecticut’s Act Concerning the Coastal
Management Act and Shoreline Flood and Erosion Control Structures, S.B. 376,
2012 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2012), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/act/pa/
2012PA-00101-R00SB-00376-PA.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). Both
statutes, inter alia, transfer authority over armoring from local to state control.
128. GRANNIS, supra note 10, at 1.
129. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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rise.130 One technique was scientifically sound but politically risky:
it prohibited the construction of permanent structures seaward of a
line drawn to reflect the most landward tidelines over the past 40
years.131 As a result of this enactment, David Lucas found himself
the owner of two undeveloped beachfront lots upon which no
house could be built even though his lots were surrounded by
large, expensive houses. A state trial court held that the statute
effected a taking of Lucas’s property because he retained no
economically viable use for the lots. The South Carolina Supreme
Court never addressed this factual conclusion because it rejected
Lucas’s takings claim on the ground that it was a reasonable
environmental measure designed to protect the public from harm.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the South Carolina Supreme
Court’s legal reliance on the prevention of environmental harm and
held that the Beachfront Management Act effected a taking per se
because it left the owner with no economic value in the property.
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Lucas has been
analyzed many times from many perspectives. Certainly, it
attempted to draw a line in the sand by stating that any restriction
on use that leaves an owner with no economic value is the
equivalent of expropriation without regard to its purpose or public
benefits unless the restriction merely duplicated use restrictions
already inherent in the title. This rule made bans on new
construction constitutionally impracticable, regardless of the
environmental benefits, unless some property law justification,
such as nuisance law, could be found to restrict the owner’s normal
development rights. Nuisance law has provided a very limited
justification for regulations preventing environmental harm
because it is premised on harm to identifiable property owners,
whereas environmental harm injures widely diffused
populations.132 Other harms from coastal development similarly
injure the broader community, by increasing the costs of
responding to natural disasters, such as hurricanes, and maintaining
infrastructure worn down by wind and water.

130. See Vicki Been, Lucas v. the Green Machine: Using the Takings Clause
to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 299, 307–08
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Moriss eds., 2d ed. 2009).
131. The Act also included more flexible provisions regulating new
construction in a “setback zone” calibrated on an extension of current erosion
rates in order to regulate in an area where dunes were expected to migrate over
the next 40 years. Such a rolling development restriction is considered at greater
length below. See infra notes 172–79 and accompanying text.
132. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 229–30 (1990).

2012]

THE CATHEDRAL ENGULFED

99

On its face, Lucas presents a formidable barrier to land-use
regulations implementing a retreat strategy because it mandates
compensation for total prohibitions on development even if
justified by the need to protect the shoreline ecology. Subsequent
decisions more sympathetic to environmental regulation have
focused both on limiting the scope of Lucas’s application and on
expanding the scope of its exception for limitations that inhere in
the owner’s title. First, the scope of Lucas has been confined
largely to its facts, which depend upon the implausible but
unchallenged trial court finding that the regulations deprived the
owner’s lots of all of their economic value.133 The Supreme
Court’s decision in Tahoe–Sierra made it clear that Lucas applies
only to regulations that effect an 100% destruction in economic
value.134 Thus, special subdivision or zoning regulations for shore
areas that permit only very few clustered structures on large lots do
not invoke Lucas and will be evaluated under the more contextual
approach of Penn Central, where the economic loss to the property
owner will be viewed in light of the public need for retreat.135
Second, although nuisance law to date has contributed little to
taming Lucas, the public trust doctrine has contributed more. As
noted above, the public trust secures public ownership or (in some
states) an easement over lands beneath navigable waters and
tidelands. The public trust inheres in title to land.136 Accordingly, it
defeats private owners’ regulatory takings claims against the
133. Among other things, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to consider the
effect on the takings analysis of the variance procedures added to the Act after
the trial court’s decision, apparently straining to reach its categorical holding.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014 n.5.
134. Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 332 (2002) (“In fact, these cases make clear that the categorical rule in
Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation
permanently deprives property of all value; the default rule remains that, in the
regulatory taxing context, we require a more fact specific inquiry.”).
135. Land-use regulations to adapt to sea-level rise that do not fall into the
Lucas category are quite likely to be upheld. Courts have been supportive of
land-use regulations addressing flooding risks because they promote safety. See,
e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty. of L.A., 258 Cal. Rptr.
893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). They have also embraced regulations based on the
future effects of climate change in several legal contexts. See, e.g., In re Polar
Bear Endangered Species Act Listing & § 4(d) Rule Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 65
(D.D.C. 2011) (upholding agency listing of polar bears as a threatened species
despite scientific uncertainty). Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)
(holding that scientific uncertainty did not excuse EPA from regulating
greenhouse gas emissions).
136. Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
Protect Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other
Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849 (2000).

100

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

application of development regulations to projects within public
trust areas.137 Moreover, it will move landward with the tideline.
Thus, as the seas rise and the public trust areas move upland, the
use rights of owners will either be extinguished or subjected to
public property interests that will permit strict regulation without
regard to Lucas. Note that when the public trust applies, the private
owner is not just relegated to Penn Central but has no takings
claim at all because the public enjoys a superior property interest.
The contours of the public trust doctrine are vague, and some
courts have substantially expanded the resources to which it
applies, as well as the public uses and values that it protects.138 A
key question is whether the proximity of private land upland to
public trust land and its anticipated conversion by accretion
enhances regulatory authority under the Takings Clause. In other
words, does the fact that a regulation seeks to restrict private land
in order to protect nearby or future public land limit the private
owner’s right so that such restrictions would not be held to be
regulatory takings although they would be in another landscape?139
On one hand, courts are unlikely to extend full public trust rights to
new categories of uplands now privately owned because doing so
would largely displace most private rights. Unless the court finds
that the public trust inheres in the private owner’s title, it cannot
save a regulation that otherwise falls within the Lucas category. On
the other hand, the arguments that regulation of private land
protects nearby public trust resources and that those private lands
likely will become public through accretion in the foreseeable
future must be powerful factors to consider under a Penn Central
analysis. These considerations add protection of the public’s
ownership interests to police power protection of public health,
safety, and welfare.
Another approach to accomplishing retreat is a prohibition
against armoring portions of the coastline.140 This Article has
already considered land-use regulations that directly prohibit or
137. See McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003);
Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding
that the city’s denial of an owner’s application to develop property in tidelands
did not effect an unconstitutional taking).
138. See, e.g., Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004); Klass, supra note
45, at 708–13.
139. See Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 11, at 69–82.
140. See GRANNIS, supra note 10, at 36–40. Prohibitions on armoring will
likely achieve a more haphazard retreat than planned regulatory retreat with
more human distress and less environmental benefit, but they may be more
politically acceptable because they highlight nature’s role in forcing retreat more
than law.
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restrict development in coastal areas. Prohibitions on building
bulkheads and other engineering defenses against sea-level rise
also implement a retreat strategy because without armoring, rising
waters and storm erosion will eventually compel owners to retreat
as properties become inundated or unsafe. Such prohibitions also
address harms that armoring can impose on natural shorelines by
exacerbating lateral erosion or by eliminating the intertidal area.
A number of states already prohibit armoring on the
oceanfront, and so far these have survived takings challenges. For
example, North Carolina’s state-level regulation prohibiting
construction of hardened structures for erosion control on the
state’s beaches was upheld.141 Such a result makes sense.
Armoring prohibitions generally do not deprive the owner of all
economically valuable use so long as the threat of erosion or
inundation remains in the future. Current use of previously
developed land is preserved. Thus, except in exigent
circumstances, the regulation should be analyzed under Penn
Central, where the importance of accommodating natural shoreline
changes and the harm to other shore lands can be considered.
Moreover, future losses to the owner will be accomplished by
nature, not by government; the owner is prohibited only from
taking defensive measures that have adverse effects on neighbors,
on the environment, and on public trust resources.142
This orthodox analysis is threatened to some extent by the
Supreme Court’s flirtation with the alternative standard, which
looks to determine if a statute or court decision has eliminated an
established property right. The plurality opinion in Stop the Beach
Renourishment embraced this test for so-called judicial takings.
The plurality stated that any judicial change in common law
property rules that eliminated an established right constitutes a
taking.143 Some prior decisions tend toward adopting this same
approach without much discussion.144
141. See Shell Island Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
142. In United States v. Milner, 583 F.3d 1174 (9th Cir. 2009), the court held
that an ordinance prohibiting seawalls did not effect a taking, noting that it
protected tribal rights in tidelands.
143. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010) (“If a legislature or a court declares that what was once an
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that property,
no less than if the State had physically appropriated it or destroyed its value by
regulation.”).
144. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 160 (1998) (holding
that interest payments upon a deposit must be assigned to the owner of the
principal).
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Adherence to such an approach would essentially prevent
legislatures in some states from prohibiting armoring without
compensation to owners. Under the common law “common enemy
rule” followed with various refinements in some states, a land
owner can take any steps required to fend off casual waters,
including flood waters, without regard to the damage to others.145
In such a state, a statutory prohibition on armoring would deprive
an owner of a common law right. Thus, a full-blooded application
of the plurality from Stop the Beach would appear to constitute a
taking because it eliminates an established common law right.146
Other states follow a “reasonable use rule” under which
landowners who divert floodwaters will not be liable unless the
resulting interference with another’s land is unreasonable. In such
states, the statutory prohibition on armoring could be found a
taking unless the court concludes that the statute fits within the
common law rule by protecting other landowners, including public
trust lands.
Such outcomes highlight the radical nature of the common law
essentialism that the plurality in Stop the Beach embraced.147
Statutes are adopted to change common law rules in light of
experience and political judgment, but this approach makes the
State compensate loser property owners when making changes
deemed to eliminate established property rights. Such an approach
excessively canonizes the status quo and creates a bulwark against
experiment and reform. Moreover, it goes against Supreme Court
precedent. For example, a virtually unanimous Court upheld a
statutory prohibition on sale of eagle parts, stating, “[T]he denial of
one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking.
At least where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property
rights, the destruction of one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking,
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety.”148 The Court
has repeatedly emphasized that it looks at the property as whole,

145. See generally Davis, supra note 83 (describing the different approaches
among the states to diffused surface water).
146. Under the Stop the Beach plurality’s approach, classic state common
law decisions changing from the common enemy to the reasonable use
approach, such as Wisconsin v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. 1974), and Tucker
v. Badoian, 384 N.E. 2d 1195 (Mass. 1978), constitute judicial takings because
they deprive one owner of an established property right to divert water without
liability. And eventually, someone will argue that such a change in the common
law is not just a taking but is constitutionally invalid because it takes a right
from A and gives it to B and therefore lacks a public use.
147. See Byrne, supra note 114.
148. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65–66 (1979).
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weighing the facts of the case to determine whether fairness
requires that the owner be compensated.149
Prohibitions on armoring may crystallize divergent paths in the
development of regulatory takings doctrine. The pathway of
common law essentialism would make efforts to adapt to climate
change dependent on adhering to common law doctrines adopted
without regard to modern science or environmental conditions,
potentially hamstringing innovations.150 Moreover, the common
law rules implicated by sea-level rise contain a myriad of obscure
rights for littoral owners, such as rights of unobstructed view,
categorical constitutional protection of which would severely
constrain regulators. The other pragmatic path, while hardly
unproblematic, does reserve constitutional compensation for
property owners unfairly burdened by large losses not reasonably
foreseeable at the time of their investment.
There is yet another, more obscure branch of regulatory takings
doctrine that may constrain an otherwise rational retreat strategy.
A long-standing, if vague and under-theorized, body of law
provides that government’s failure to maintain public access can
effectuate a taking of the marooned property.151 Thus, a decision
not to rebuild roads or bridges threatened by rising seas or more
severe or more frequent storms can trigger a constitutional duty to
compensate owners losing access to the public road system.152 The
paucity of decisions, mostly in lower state courts, and the brief,
precedent-minded opinions make it difficult to predict how
vigorous a constraint this might be for a locality facing mounting
costs for damaged or threatened infrastructure.
The problem can be observed by considering a decision of a
Florida state court of appeals.153 In Jordan v. St. Johns County,
property owners on a barrier island alleged an inverse
condemnation because St. Johns County, Florida, had intentionally
failed to maintain the sole access road, which was “subject to
repeated damage from natural forces such as storms and
149. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497–99 (1987).
150. See Byrne, supra note 59.
151. See William B. Stoebuck, The Property Right of Access Versus the
Power of Eminent Domain, 47 TEX. L. REV. 733 (1969).
152. See David A. Lewis, Constitutional Property Law Analysis of State and
Local Government Disinvestment in Infrastructure as a Coastal Adaptation
Strategy (2012) (unpublished student paper) (on file with author); Travis Martay
Brennan, Redefining the American Coastline: Can the Government Withdraw
Basic Services From the Coast and Avoid Takings Claims?, 14 OCEAN &
COASTAL L.J. 101 (2008).
153. Jordan v. St. Johns Cnty., 63 So. 3d 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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erosion.”154 The appeals court reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to the County, ruling that a “governmental
entity has a duty to reasonably maintain its public roads.”155
Moreover, the failure of the government to act in the face of this
duty “can support a claim for inverse condemnation.”156 The court
relied on prior decisions of the Florida Supreme Court dealing with
road reconstruction eliminating access to the public highway.
“There is a right to be compensated through inverse condemnation
when governmental action causes a substantial loss of access to
one’s property even though there is no physical appropriation of
the property itself.”157
Such an approach, if courts vigorously pursue it, could severely
hamstring reasonable government planning for retreat, even in the
absence of regulation of private property uses.158 This judiciallycreated doctrine may have made sense in light of an owner’s
normal reliance on public access for his or her land and concerns
about government discrimination, but such rationale is greatly
diminished in the shadow of sea-level rise. Plainly, government
must discontinue providing access to parcels rendered
uninhabitable by water. Nor should government be expected to
fund rehabilitation of public ways at unlimited expense to elevate
roads above wet land. Those points being granted, a court should
defer to government’s reasonable judgments that sea-level rise has
rendered maintenance of a public roadway unsafe or economically
imprudent. Judge-made doctrines to protect property owners under
normal conditions should not be extended to provide inflexible
protections under changed environmental conditions.
III. THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION
A characteristic of our property law is its accommodation of
changes in ownership and ownership rights over time. In
particular, it allows legal measures presently enacted or granted to
change rights in the future. The system of estates in land and future
interests that English common law created has pioneered
154. Id. at 837.
155. Id. at 839.
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting Palm Beach Cnty. v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846, 849 (Fla.
1989)).
158. The Coastal Barrier Resources Act prohibits the federal government
from providing federal funds for constructing roads, docks, or new infrastructure
on undeveloped barrier islands. 16 U.S.C. § 3504 (2006). Its prospective
character insulates it from the removal of public access doctrine discussed in the
text.
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astounding flexibility in dividing ownership rights over time, both
conditioning rights of possession or disposition and cutting them
off. As previously noted, sea-level rise also raises perplexing
issues of time, as society regulates land use to cope with natural
forces that will impose increasing threats and eventually submerge
private property. In Part II, this Article outlined several of the
takings-related problems inherent in various forms of adaption
land-use regulation. This Part considers the advantages that time
provides to a government seeking to implement a retreat strategy
through land-use regulations. This Part presents four approaches
that employ time as a feature of dynamic regulation, which will
avoid or minimize takings liability. Such legal measures enact
regulations or take other legal actions now that will have effects
primarily in the future.
As a preliminary matter, time has become a familiar element of
land-use regulatory systems. Early zoning systems employed
largely static approaches, under which regulation presupposed
unchanging rules enacted at a single moment.159 But growth
control regulation began in the 1960s and employed dynamic
models under which the permissibility of certain uses was set to
change over time according to changing conditions or findings.160
Courts largely upheld such innovations, and phased development
regulations have become uncontroversial. Moreover, the core of
urban land-use regulation has become site-specific legislative
changes in zoning, often negotiated with the owner and
accompanied by exactions to mitigate the effects or public costs of
new development.161 Even more pertinent to adaptation to climate
change, many statutes, such as the federal Endangered Species Act
and local historic preservation ordinances, extend new regulatory
controls on private property as a result of new administrative
findings, themselves often reflecting changed ecological conditions
or the passage of time.162 In short, employing time as a dynamic
factor in addressing a changing natural condition seems fitting and
right.
159. For the classic example of zoning considered as one-time regulation
based on end state planning, see Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
160. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 285 N.E.2d 291
(N.Y. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
161. See generally Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining
Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987).
162. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2006) (listing a species as endangered or
threatened), with D.C. CODE §6-1103(c)(3) (Westlaw 2012) (process for
designating a historic landmark or historic district).
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This Part focuses on using time in support of retreat regulations
because retreat measures raise the most opposition from property
owners as well as takings issues because in many circumstances
retreat is the most cost-effective and environmentally beneficial
approach. Furthermore, retreat is most easily calibrated to the
passage of time. Retreat prohibits new construction in whole or in
part, as well as reconstruction in sensitive areas. Yet it need not do
so immediately. Moreover, some areas that may be regulated now
will become publicly owned as waters rise. In general, sea-level
rise would not present environmental problems if the coasts were
not so heavily and ubiquitously developed because natural features
and environmental services would simply move inland. The
problem retreat addresses is how to allow these natural forces to
operate given existing development and incentives.
Below, this Part presents and discusses four retreat measures
that state or local land-use regulators may take in the near future to
address sea-level rise before the its effects are felt in their entirety.
To an extent, these measures seek to change regulations as needed
over time so that private owners and the public can share use
benefits. The goal is to allow owners to benefit while they may but
also to effectively address the compelling needs to withdraw
development from the advancing shoreline and permit valuable
ecosystems to establish themselves in new inland locations.
Such efforts may also help shape landowners’ future
expectations, both allowing them to adapt economically and
reducing the likelihood that courts will find regulations’
application to them to constitute takings. In general, widespread
discussion about the challenges of sea-level rise and long term
planning to adapt to it helps government, property owners, and the
public generally to understand and adjust to the changes it
demands. One prominent understanding of the regulatory takings
doctrine is that it protects property owners who bear
disproportionate or unanticipated transition costs from changes in
property law.163 That perspective is prominent within the Penn
Central approach, which puts at its core the frustration of
reasonable “investment-backed expectations.”164 Within that
understanding, embedding future restrictions in law or plans
lessens surprise and permits owners to adjust or hedge against

163. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967).
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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those future changes, lessening the losses to them and reducing the
likelihood that a court subsequently will find a taking.165
A. Moratorium
A moratorium temporarily prohibits new development until a
planning inquiry can be conducted and a zoning regulation
adopted. Moratoria are familiar if not frequent parts of the land-use
planning process. The U.S. Supreme Court has written that “the
consensus in the planning community appears to be that moratoria,
or ‘interim development controls’ as they are often called, are an
essential tool of successful development.”166 A moratorium has the
virtue of creating time for a study of a problem or area before
allowing long-lasting development to proceed. It also creates
horizontal equity among potential owners contemplating
development by denying an advantage to those who can quickly
build before new regulations are adopted and by subjecting all to
the same delay and new regulations.
A moratorium on armoring or on new development near the sea
may make sense for some jurisdictions. Public consciousness about
sea-level rise has only just begun, and a planning process can
educate citizens about risks and alternatives. New studies about the
pace of sea-level rise and its practical consequences seem to be
published daily. Similarly, information about alternatives to hard
armoring may enable owners to understand how to protect their
property without environmental harm.167 A moratorium could
create breathing space for such planning and debate, especially if
large-scale developments have been proposed that would change
the shoreline before informed decisions could be made. Moratoria
are more transparent and evenhanded than their near alternative,
165. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship v. District of Columbia, 198
F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting takings claim where owner subdivided in
anticipation of designation as historic landmark).
166. Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 337–38 (2002).
167. Connecticut recently enacted new legislation that minimizes the use of
hard armoring in favor of enhancing natural barriers to sea-level rise (i.e., soft
armoring) and placing new structures further from the shoreline. A Republican
legislator and shore front property owner, who initially supported a bill more
single-mindedly protective of property rights, remarked about the “living
shoreline” techniques embraced by the enacted statute: “This opens it up to
whole new ways to protect the shoreline; it's kind of cool. . . . I’m definitely
going to take a look at it.” Jan Ellen Siegel, Coastal Management Legislation
Balances Environmental Concerns with Property Rights, CTMIRROR.ORG (May
9, 2012), http://www.ctmirror.org/story/16289/coastal-management-legislationbalances-environmental-concerns-property-rights.

108

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

informal administrative delay in granting permits until planning is
completed.
A moratorium is not a per se temporary taking, even if it
prohibits all development on a property for a period of time. The
Supreme Court rejected such a contention in the Tahoe–Sierra
case, where the Court held that a moratorium on development
could not be considered a Lucas total taking for the period of the
moratorium.168 Such claims must be adjudicated under the Penn
Central standards, by which any diminution in value to the
property had to be measured against the value of the entire fee
simple property interest. The Court noted that many properties will
not decline in market value at all if development is postponed by a
moratorium.169 The Court emphasized that a moratorium would not
countenance a “temporal severance,” that is, evaluating the effects
of a regulation only for the period of time in which it is in effect
rather than in regard to the entire temporal span of the underlying
ownership interest. A fee simple ownership interest is one of
potentially infinite duration.170
Moratoria are generally, but not universally, permitted under
state law. The key issues for courts turn on whether the
moratorium was adopted in good faith for a valid planning purpose
and whether the duration is reasonable in light of its purpose.171 A
moratorium adopted to plan for new land-use regulations for
coastal properties should be found to have a valid purpose, given
the challenge and the need to consider new forms of regulation.
The problem may be how long such a moratorium may last. The
complexities of sea-level rise will not presently be solved in any
final way. But if a jurisdiction engages in a planning process with a
definite goal and timeframe, a moratorium for that period should
be held reasonable. The moratorium that survived takings review
in Tahoe–Sierra lasted six years, not an unreasonable time given
the complex task of figuring out how to permit residential
development while also safeguarding the clarity of Lake Tahoe
from runoff.

168. Tahoe–Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.
169. Id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless
by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover
value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”).
170. Id.
171. See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND
USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 495–98 (2d ed. 2007).
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B. Rolling Development Restrictions
Rolling development restrictions were one of the first
innovative regulatory tools proposed for addressing sea-level rise.
Rolling development restrictions are special zoning rules severely
restricting new development or redevelopment on land near the
shore. Their defining feature is that the development restrictions
move landward, or “roll,” as the tide line moves landward.172 Thus,
just as sea-level rise pushes the boundary between public trust
tidelands and private uplands landward through accretion, the
adjacent regulatory zone moves landward in front of the tideline.
Instead of transferring title to the public, as the public trust
doctrine does, the rolling development restriction makes applicable
to land the special restrictions needed to adapt to sea-level rise as
the seas draw nearer. Rolling development restrictions embody the
concept of retreat, increasingly restricting development as the seas
rise.
Rolling development restrictions offer property owners some
substantial benefits, at least as compared with other forms of strict
land-use regulation. First, they impose no regulations tailored to
sea-level rise before they are needed, preserving to the owner use
and development rights in the meantime. This may be especially
important given the lack of certainty as to the pace of sea-level rise
because rolling development restrictions would preserve the
owners’ rights until the seas actually begin to threaten their
property. Second, despite the uncertainty concerning timing,
rolling restrictions give owners certainty as to the effects of sealevel rise, allowing them to arrange their plans accordingly. The
rolling feature also ties the restriction closely to the problem being
addressed, making it more difficult for regulators to pursue
alternative or hidden agendas in beachfront regulation.
The rolling feature, of course, helps retreat regulations pass
regulatory takings review. Rolling regulations avoid the Lucas rule
because they permit development and use now, which should have
substantial economic value. Given the Tahoe–Sierra Court’s
rejection of temporal severance, the owner cannot suffer a 100%
diminution in value, however strict future development restrictions
may be. A court reviewing a rolling development restriction must
172. Byrne & Grannis, supra note 10. The clearest example of a rolling
development restriction is Maine’s Sand Dunes Rules, which provide that “[a]
project may not be permitted if, within 100 years, the property may reasonably
be expected to be eroded as a result of changes in the shoreline such that the
project is likely to be severely damaged after allowing for a two foot rise in sea
level over 100 years.” 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 355, § 5 (Westlaw 2012).
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consider its effect on the whole property for its full duration. For
example, a beach house that will eventually become subject even
to an extremely strict rolling regulation that would require the
house to be abandoned would still have a substantial currenteconomic value based on the estimate of when sea-level rise would
push the restrictive zone upon it. The key to this analysis is that the
regulation applies immediately but restricts the property only when
necessary to achieve the public purpose. Of course, many such
private properties will become fully public when the tides cover
them.
James Titus, at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
developed rolling development restrictions and termed the
regulatory instrument a “rolling easement,” invoking the easement
protected under the Texas Open Beaches Act.173 That Act protects
public easements of access on Texas beaches landward of the mean
high tideline created by prescription or custom; public trust
tidelands lie seaward of that tideline.174 Texas courts long
interpreted public beach easements to roll landward with the
tideline due to erosion or storms. Landowners upon whose land the
easement rolled were required to demolish any structures that
materially interfered with public access. The Texas courts
repeatedly held that the rolling of the easement did not take any
legal rights from the owner because the private land already had
been subject to the easement and the possibility of its rolling.175
Titus imaginatively saw this structure as providing an appropriate
template for land-use regulations implementing a retreat strategy.
The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Severance v. Patterson
threw the template into doubt.176 That case has a tortuous and
bizarre procedural history, which need not be considered here. The
sharply divided court held that a Texas beach easement does not
roll without effecting a taking of an upland home, at least when the
coastline moves rapidly in an avulsive event. The court’s final
opinion, although thoughtful, can be criticized on several grounds.
But for present purposes, it must be emphasized that its takings
analysis applies only to avulsion and to public access easements
and not to rolling use restrictions tied to sea-level rise.

173. Titus, supra note 11, at 1313.
174. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 61.011–61.026 (West 2011).
175. See Arrington v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 38 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.
2001); Feinman v. Texas, 717 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. App. 1986); Moody v. White,
593 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Matcha v. Mattox, 711 S.W.2d 95 (Tex.
App. 1986).
176. 370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012).
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First, the court made it clear that even public access easements
can move by accretion without provoking a taking. The court
explained:
Although existing public easements in the dry beach of
Galveston’s West Beach are dynamic, as natural forces
cause the vegetation and the mean high tide lines to move
gradually and imperceptibly, these easements do not spring
or roll landward to encumber other parts of the parcel or
new parcels as a result of avulsive events.177
However insubstantial may be the distinction between accretion
and avulsion, sea-level rise, compared with erosion from a
hurricane, does move gradually and imperceptibly.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Severance court,
following U.S. Supreme Court precedent, drew a sharp distinction
between laws that authorize public access and those that regulate
use. The former are always takings, while the latter are generally
permissible unless they go “too far.”178 The court explicitly
rejected an argument that “blurs the line between ownership and
right to use of a portion of a parcel.”179 A statutory regulation,
unlike a common law easement, can apply to land before the
conditions that trigger different restrictions come into force.
Moreover, there seems no reason why a statute creating rolling
development restrictions cannot condition the rolling on sea-level
rise without regard to the accretion–avulsion distinction. Because a
development restriction is not a taking per se, it need not so closely
adhere to rules for transferring ownership.
Thus, rolling development restrictions remain a viable and
imaginative regulatory tool for implementing a retreat strategy.
They preserve unimpeded current use to the private owner while
immediately imposing a legal burden on the property that in the
future will significantly restrict use rights. They neither authorize
public access nor completely eliminate all economic value, so they
are not takings per se. Considered under Penn Central, they
preserve substantial economic value while shaping the owner’s
expectations long before significant limitations on use become
enforceable. While not every rolling development restriction will
177. Id. at 372.
178. See Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002); Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 725 (“To say that the
appropriation of a public easement across a landowner’s premises does not
constitute the taking of a property interest but rather . . . ‘a mere restriction on its
use,’ . . . is to use words in a manner that deprives them of all their ordinary
meaning.” (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987)).
179. Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 726.
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survive regulatory takings review under current law, most drafted
with an eye to Penn Central should. Such temporally flexible
instruments make a virtue of the challenge inherent in sea-level
rise—that we must carefully plan now for risks that will only
materialize in the uncertain future.
C. Exactions
Some regulations implementing retreat will be at high risk of
being held to be takings. States have different common law
traditions, different judicial politics, and some have different state
constitutional takings doctrines. Moreover, the federal
constitutional takings doctrine has been subject to ebbs and flows,
so regulations that might have been held takings in one decade
might not have been have been in another. Future presidential
elections will have more influence on constitutional property rights
development than will logic.
One area of regulatory takings law that has remained stable for
some time is exactions. This refers to the now very familiar
practice of land-use regulators granting permits for development
upon the condition that the owner convey some interest in property
to the public in order to mitigate public harms or costs from the
development. The public can obtain interests through exactions
that would violate the Takings Clause if directly appropriated.
Thus, government can require a property owner to convey a public
easement as a proper condition to the granting of a construction
permit, even if an ordinance simply mandating such access would
constitute a taking per se. The Supreme Court has adjudicated
uniform constitutional standards for such exactions. First, the
interest exacted must have a “logical nexus” with a legitimate
public purpose. Second, the interest exacted must be “roughly
proportionate” to the impact of the development.180
Land-use regulators should be able to use exactions to
implement severe use restrictions that could not be legislated
directly without incurring takings liability. For example, consider
prohibitions on armoring. This Article argued above that such
prohibitions normally should not be considered takings. But in a
state that recognized a strong common law right to armor, it might
be held to be a taking because it eliminates an established common
law right. But in many cases, the concern about bulkheads is
directed at future, not present, sea-level rise. Thus, if an owner
seeks a permit to develop a lot that may be threatened by rising
waters in the foreseeable future but is not now, the government can
180. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
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grant the development permit on the condition that no future
armoring will be permitted. Indeed, imposing such conditions is
now a consistent policy of the California Coastal Commission.181
By hypothesis, the owner has no immediate need to armor the
shore and can enjoy full use of the property for some period
without such construction. Such a condition plainly and logically
advances important policies protecting the natural shore and
neighboring landowners. It is quite proportionate to those harms
because it seeks not to prevent beneficial use now, but only when
the harm will crystalize. Like rolling development restrictions, it
divides use rights in time between the private owner and the
public.
Many stringent regulatory policies can be implemented through
exactions that could not be legislated directly. In addition to
prohibitions on armoring, government might impose conditions
that prohibit rebuilding after destruction from a storm, or obtain
conservation easements where current wetlands may survive or
where future wetlands or dunes may form. Of course, exactions
work only in the context of granting development permits. That
sea-level rise is a known risk that will materialize in the future
invites legal instruments that are implemented now but have public
value later as seas rise.
D. Eminent Domain of Future Interests
There will be properties of which government will need to take
ownership in order to effectively manage retreat. These may be
lands that will require active management for current or future
habitat for species displaced by sea-level rise or other
consequences of climate change. Also, some areas will need to be
held open so that natural costal features, such as wetlands or dunes,
can reconstitute themselves or be constructed there. Finally,
government will need to obtain some areas to constitute
infrastructure, such as roads, that the sea will destroy. Some of
these lands will simply need to be purchased, either consensually
or through condemnation. Of course, government need not
purchase lands that will be inundated because the rules of accretion
will subject them to the public trust without any need for legal
action. But the preservation of valuable environmental services and
public functions will require the acquisition of dry land not subject
to the public trust.
Land purchase poses the serious problem of financing
payment. Outright purchase of large parcels adequate to meet
181. Caldwell & Segall, supra note 11, at 564.
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probable environmental needs will cost a great deal of money,
especially in light of the many other financial needs that sea-level
rise will impose on public authorities. Moreover, the public will
need areas meeting specific criteria—land to serve as wetlands or
to otherwise provide environmental services eliminated by rising
seas. Thus, owners of suitable land will possess situational
monopolies that will necessitate the use of the power of eminent
domain.182 That presents additional obstacles. Eminent domain is
exceedingly unpopular and, therefore, generally avoided by elected
officials.183 The Fifth Amendment, of course, requires
compensation to be paid at full market value.184
The temporal dimension provides a partial solution here, as
well. Government can use eminent domain to condemn future
interests rather than full titles or fee simples. Government needs to
take possession of most of the properties at issue only in the future,
although it might well need to know that it will be able to take
possession of them as sea-level rise progresses. Thus, the
condemnation of future interests will provide assurance of future
public possession of special sites. The present market value of a
future interest will be a fraction of the present value of the full fee
simple interest. The longer in the future the right of possession of
the future interest holder is projected, the lower the present value
will be. At the same time, condemnation of future interests does
not intrude as much into the interests of the private owners, who
can continue to use the property beneficially for the time being,
perhaps for as long as his or her life. Thus, condemnation of future
interests presents a surprising win–win outcome, as compared with
immediate or future condemnation of full title.
There seems to be no reason why government cannot condemn
future interests in real property. Even though no judicial decision
has addressed the question, there seems every reason to believe
that such a power would be upheld. Nothing in the Constitution
prohibits it. Statutory authorizations clearly empower both the
United States and New York to take all kinds of property interests
by eminent domain. The Supreme Court wrote long ago: “The
taking by condemnation of an interest less than the fee is familiar
in the law of eminent domain. Where formal proceedings are
initiated by the party condemning, it is usual and proper to specify
182. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
1220–21 (2007).
183. See J. Peter Byrne, Condemnation of Low Income Residential Communities
Under the Takings Clause, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 131 (2005).
184. Just compensation “means the full and perfect equivalent in money of
the property taken.” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
AND POLICIES
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the precise interest taken, where less than the fee.”185 One
commentator has stated: “Future interests are clearly subject to
being taken under the power of eminent domain, since the power
has been generally held to extend to every type of interest, estate,
possession, or expectancy.”186 Moreover, the federal government
has used a functional equivalent for more than 40 years without
serious challenge: taking an entire interest in land but permitting
the owner a “reservation of use and occupancy” for life or for a
number of years.
The power of eminent domain is inherent in government. The
Fifth Amendment restricts this power only in requiring that it be
exercised for a “public use” and that the owner receive “just
compensation.” Taking land for conservation purposes is doubtless
a “public use.”187 Questions concerning which land or how large
an interest should be taken for a public purpose lie within
legislative discretion.188 Although taking a future interest implies
that government needs only to make a future use of the land, that
should not eliminate the public use because a present taking for
future needs is permissible. The Supreme Court itself stated: “In
determining whether the taking of property is necessary for public
use not only the present demands of the public, but those which
may be fairly anticipated in the future, may be considered.”189
Moreover, the taking of only a future interest would counter any
concern that the government would be guilty of “excess
condemnation” that might not constitute a public use190 because
government would be limiting displacement of private owners to
the foreseeable future when the land would be required to cope
with sea-level rise.
State exercises of eminent domain are governed by state
statutes. These generally do not limit the types of property interests
the state may condemn. New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure
185. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328–29 (1917).
186. Robert L. Stoyles, Jr., Condemnation of Future Interests, 43 IOWA L.
REV. 241, 243 (1958).
187. See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893); Swan Lake
Hunting Club v. United States, 381 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1967).
188. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954) (“It is not for the courts to
determine whether it is necessary for successful consummation of the project
that unsafe, unsightly, or insanitary buildings alone be taken or whether title to
the land be included, any more than it is the function of the courts to sort and
choose among the various parcels selected for condemnation.”); In re Harlem
River Bridge, 66 N.E. 584 (N.Y. 1903) (Government generally prefers to take
full title to land because it permits unrestricted use and necessitates no
continuing relationship with the former private owner.).
189. Rindge Co. v. Cnty. of L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
190. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448–49 (1930).
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Law, for example, broadly defines the “real property” that can be
condemned to include:
[A]ll land and improvements, lands under water, waterfront
property, the water of any lake, pond or stream, all
easements and hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, and
every estate, interest and right, legal or equitable, in lands
or water, and right, interest, privilege, easement and
franchise relating to the same, including terms for years and
liens by way of mortgage or otherwise.191
This language plainly includes future interests. The government’s
authority to take easements rather than full title is well
established.192 Indeed, courts have sometimes created a
presumption that condemnation of a right of way transfers only an
easement rather than a fee interest in the transportation corridor.193
Government can also condemn temporary interests in land and
leaseholds, when it suits public needs.194
The National Park Service (NPS) has been using condemnation
to take the equivalent of future interests for many years. The Cape
Cod National Seashore Act, for example, provides that when the
Service seeks to condemn “improved property,” essentially a
single-family home and lot, the owner may “elect” to retain “the
right of use and possession” for up to a 25-year term or for the
owners’ lives.195 When the private owner elects to retain a life
estate or term of years, NPS obtains a future interest analogous to a
reversion. Current NPS policy also generally provides for similar
reservations in owners of condemned lands. NPS Director’s Order
number 25, section 11.3, authorizes NPS to “allow a reservation of
use and occupancy of property improved with a residence.”196
Thus, while some statutes require NPS to offer reservations at
some sites, NPS may do so at any of its sites.197 Under this
191. N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp. 2012).
192. Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles:
Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements
from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351
(2000).
193. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Roby v.
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 36 N.E. 1053 (1894); Wright & Hester,
supra note 192, at 377.
194. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
195. 16 U.S.C. § 459b-3(a) (2006).
196. Nat’l Park Serv., Director’s Order #25: Land Protection § 11.3 (2001),
available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/DOrders/DOrder25.htm.
197. New York employs a similar approach in authorizing acquisition and
condemnation of park land pursuant to the Park and Recreation Land
Acquisition Bond Acts. New York Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation
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approach, NPS can condemn property but allow the owner to retain
possession and use for either up to a 25-year term or a “life estate.”
These reservations are a “deeded interest,” meaning that after
conveyance they amount to property rights that may not be
abrogated except as provided in the statute. Neither can they be
extended. The only substantive difference between such
reservations and this Article’s proposal for condemning future
interests is that under the NPS approach the owner must agree to
accept the reservation. Also, in this Article’s proposal, the vesting
of the government in possession would occur as the seas rise.
Condemnation of future interests in lands identified as having
significance for adaptation to sea-level rise will not only give the
government full ownership of the land in the future, but it will also
enhance regulatory authority immediately. As a future interest
holder, government would have the right to bring an action against
those currently in possession for “waste,” that is, to prevent current
changes in use that would cause unreasonable or excessive harm to
the reversionary interest.198 Government rights against waste may
permit the government to prohibit some actions that a court might
otherwise find to be a taking, such as habitat destruction or
construction of a seawall. Such a right would inhere in the title to
the property and thus would be included within the exception to
the Lucas rule.199
The question of how much compensation the government
would save by condemning only a future interest would depend
primarily on how far in the future the government plans to take
possession of the property. This depends on the events used to

Law section 15.11 authorizes the state or municipality in certain circumstances
to enter into agreements concerning acquired or taken parkland whereby the
owner may continue to occupy and use them for no more than ten years. There is
no provision for life estates. N.Y. PARKS REC. & HIST. PRESERV. LAW § 15.11
(Westlaw 2012).
198. On the common law action of the holder of a reversion against waste by
the tenant in possession, see JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY
LAW 126–27 (3d ed. 2012).
199. Peloso & Caldwell, supra note 11, at 85. Peloso and Caldwell argue that
state governments should be understood, as a matter of law, to have a future
interest and also actions for waste against properties on the shore because they
will become public trust owners as sea-level rise moves the tideline upland. Id.
at 83–86. The proposal in this Article concerns lands that will not be inundated
in the foreseeable future; it concerns land that the government will decide it
needs to fully manage in the future in order to adapt to sea-level rise and other
consequences of climate change. It also addresses an explicit acquisition of a
future interest rather than arguing that accretion creates a future interest by
operation of law.
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trigger that right. Generally, just compensation means that
government must pay fair market value: what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller.200 Although no case concerning
condemnation of a naked future interest could be found, there is
established law about how to value a future interest when the
government condemns land that already is subject to a future
interest; in such a case, compensation must be divided between the
present and future interest holders.201 To determine the value of the
government’s future interest, one could deduct the value of the
present possessory estate from the appraised value of the land.
This, of course, requires some estimate of how long the present
possessory estate will endure, something analogous to the use of
actuarial estimates for the duration of life estates. Alternatively,
one could calculate the discounted present value of the right to
possess full title to the land at termination of the present
possessory estate. This amounts to the current value of full title to
the land discounted for the expected time until the seas rise or
other conditions are met. This equals the amount of money that,
invested now at prevailing interest rates, will equal the dollar value
of the fee simple interest in the land at the time the government
expects to gain full ownership. The discount rate would be based
upon prevailing interest rates because it essentially measures the
time value of money. Despite current historically low interest rates,
this would save substantial money for events projected into the
latter years of this century.
CONCLUSION
Property law sets boundaries between the individual and
society. Unprecedented changes in the natural world must change
the calculation of what society can require of individual property
owners. Sea-level rise changes the extent to which a private owner
can develop land at the coast and armor the coastline. Such legal
reforms will be made differently in different states and in
communities with different property traditions, regulatory
structures, and environmental conditions. Constitutional property
rights, enforced through the regulatory takings doctrine should be,
at most, a loose constraint on how states seek to reform land-use
regulation to protect public safety and the environmental services
upon which humans collectively rely.
200. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
201. See 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN & RUSSELL D. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 12D.03[2]–[3] (3d ed. 2012).

